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 The accompanying exhibits are 
crib sheets that voters may take along 
to any political rallies they attend over 
the next two months.   
  If much of what follows has a 
familiar ring, it is because I’ve devoted 
separate articles to the budget and 
unfunded retiree liabilities in the pre-




  The State of Connecticut is pursu-
ing spending programs for government 
services that cost more money in total 
than it takes in as revenues.  Barring 
changes in its behavior—or a sudden, 
sustained, and (if you ask me) unlikely 
shift in our economic fortunes—it will 
continue to do so.  The State’s fisc is in 
a chronic or “structural” deficit. 
  So how has the State managed 
to meet the constitutionally required 
“balanced budgets” for the current 
biennium of fiscal years (FY) 2009/10 
and 2010/11?  The main reasons are 
(1) Federal “stimulus” grants; (2) the 
“securitization” of proceeds from law-
suits (e.g., on tobacco); (3) one-time 
odds and ends (including the dregs of 
the “Rainy Day” Funds set aside before 
the Great Recession struck); and (4) 
borrowing to pay for current services.
  Items (1)-(3) will no longer be 
available starting in FY 2011/12.  Thus, 
even if recent painful spending cuts 
(on the order of half a billion dollars in 
each of FY 2009/10 and FY 2010/11) 
are not restored, Connecticut still faces 
persistent deficits of about $3 billion 
for each of the next three fiscal years—
i.e., through June 30, 2014 (see the 
first crib sheet).  Such deficits are 16-
17% of total General Fund revenues 
(mainly income and sales taxes).  Do 
voters want the State to resort, again, 
to item (4) and borrow more to “bal-
ance” those budgets?
 Before answering, be reminded 
that we would be borrowing to pay 
for current services, not capital projects 
that would yield benefits well into the 
future.  Connecticut already leads the 
nation in bonded indebtedness per 
capita.  Against that backdrop, and 
with the prospect of continued struc-
tural budget deficits, capital markets 
will want higher interest rates and 
shorter terms to maturity, pushing up 
our already swollen debt-service spend-
ing.  And when (not if) the State needs 
to bond new capital projects, it will 
cost us taxpayers more than if we had 
not borrowed all that money to pay for 
current services.
 It is true that the State of 
Connecticut ran a “surplus” in FY 
2009/10, on the strength of surprising-
ly strong revenue growth, especially in 
personal income and sales taxes, cou-
pled with some spending cuts, between 
the bleak midwinter of 2009/10 and 
the spring of 2010.  (That left a “sur-
plus”, given all the one-time revenue 
sources in items (1)-(3) above.)  But 
even if our luck holds—that is, both 
income and sales taxes in fact grow as 
now forecasted—the State still faces 
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structural deficits of $3 billion a year 
through FY 2013/14.
  Between you, me and the hard 
place, our luck probably will not hold. 
The rosier expectations of this past 
spring are more likely to fade than to 
pan out.  The Federal Reserve Board 
and other policy agencies are now 
seriously worried about the D-word, 
deflation.  Even if their worst fears fail 
to materialize, the seeming economic 
recovery of last spring has pretty clearly 
stalled, and what’s bad for the national 
economy is also bad for the major 
engines of Connecticut State revenue 
growth.
  Bottom line? ASK THE 
CANDIDATES: “What mix of spend-
ing cuts and tax increases would you 
try to get passed if you were Governor 
or a state legislator?”
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  Feeling taxed yet?  Sorry, but it 
turns out that, besides the $3 billion 
per year in spending cuts or new taxes 
to end the structural State budget 
deficits, Connecticut also needs to find 
another $3 billion per year to invest 
in assets that will support the mount-
ing liabilities for retiree pensions and 
health insurance owed to state workers, 
past and present (see the second crib 
sheet).  If we don’t fund State pension 
and retiree health insurance obliga-
tions now, future taxpayers will have to 
cough up the money to pay for State-
government services we’re consuming 
today.
  The $42 billion worth of pension 
and retiree health-insurance obliga-
tions are the result of actions taken in 
good faith by both parties.  Governors 
and legislators defined jobs to be done 
on behalf of the citizens of the state, 
and State employees agreed to do those 
jobs in return for salaries and deferred 
compensation in the form of pensions 
and post-retirement health insurance.
 Barring changes in policy, if 
Connecticut does not pay the $3 bil-
lion in annual contributions now 
required to amortize the $42 billion, 
the unfunded liabilities will keep grow-
ing—and taxpayers will have to pay 
more every year to amortize the yet 
larger liability.  
  This is not a problem we can 
simply wish away. During the pre-pri-
mary campaign, one ostensibly serious, 
now-former candidate stated that, if 
elected governor, he would simply sus-
pend contributions to funding retiree 
liabilities, to help balance the budget.   
Imagine the reaction of credit mar-
kets, or of current State employees, or 
of State retirees.  Trial lawyers would 
think they’d died and gone to heaven.
  Just slowing the growth of unfund-
ed liabilities, never mind cutting exist-
ing obligations, will mean changes 
in pension and benefit programs.   
Virtually all such changes will require 
difficult, protracted negotiations with 
the unions representing State work-
ers.  Trimming pension formulas, rais-
ing employee contributions, switching 
from defined-benefit to defined-contri-
bution retirement plans, increasing co-
pays and reducing the scope of health 
insurance coverage—all are painful 
even to talk about, much less begin 
negotiating on.  But other states have 
begun the process, and Connecticut 
does not have a choice.
  There may be some “creative” ways 
to structure deals that union leaders can 
sell to their members.  For instance, the 
State could offer one-time, up-front 
infusions of cash into defined-contri-
bution retirement savings accounts of 
employees who agree to switch out of 
the State pension system.  But “creativ-
ity” will itself cost money, and it has its 
limits.  Most of the changes in store will 
cause considerable pain, in the form of 
smaller benefits or cost-shifting, such 
as increased out-of-pocket payments 
for doctor visits and prescriptions.
  Bottom line? ASK THE 
CANDIDATES: “How exactly do you 
propose to cover the costs to responsi-
bly fund State employee pension and 
health insurance obligations?  And how 
could the State bring the growth of 
such obligations under control?”
ASK THE CANDIDATES, “HOW WOULD YOU TACKLE...
UNFUNDED STATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFITS?”
SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, Summer 2010, page 11.
Unfunded 
Liabilities, 2008




Public Pensions $15.86 billion 61.6% $1.25 billion $3.25 billion
Health Insurance and 
Other Retiree Benefits $26.02 billion 0.0% $1.72 billion $0.48 billion
Sum $41.88 billion $2.97 billion $3.73 billion